On Rule-Specific Constraints in Syntax by Neeld, Ronald L.
OSU WPL 18.132-171 (1975), 
On Rule-Specific Constraints in Syntax* 
Ronald L. Neeld 
Fauconnier (1971) noted that two types of global constraints 
had been proposed. On the one hand, there are particular constraints 
that mention specific rules in specific languages. On the other 
hand there are general constraints (not necessarily universal: 
quantifier constraints do not hold for all dialects of English) 
which do not refer to specific rules of granunar. Fauconriier 
speculates: • •.. it may be possible to dispense altogether with 
language-specific global constraints' (255), To be sure, the issue 
of generality of _constraints and the issue of universality are 
partially separate. But only partially: showing the generality 
of constraints is a preliminary to showing their universality. A 
constraint that mentions a specific rule in a particular language is 
not universal, The issue of the·generality of constraints is 
interesting enough to be worth pursuing furthe~. Of the constraints 
presented in the literature some are general and some are particular 
But are.the particular constraints really global? In this paper 
I examine this question. . 
Suppose we wish to examine the general properties of dollar 
bills, but some are counterfeit. Obviously, we first have to 
eliminate the bogus bills. Likewise, if we wish to exwnine the 
general properties of global constraints, we must eliminate the 
counterfeit constraints. There is a tendency for proponents of 
global rules to justify everything that has been proposed as a 
global constraint. But certainly no one who accepts transformations 
believes that everything that has been proposed as a transformation 
is in fact a transformation. I now turn my attention to those 
constraints that are highly specific in character in order to 
show that they may be removed from the class of global constraints. 
1. Passive/Egui. 
It was noticed by Robin Lakoff (reported in G. Lakoff (1970)) 
that no single lexical item may take a for-to complementizer and 
undergo both Passive and.Equi: 
(1) a. Sam expected to leave last ni~ht. 
b. *To leave last night was expected by Sam. 
This restriction requires use of a global constraint. However, 
Grinder (1971: 97-131) shows that the examples given by Lakoff 
are blocked by a far more general constraint, Controller Cross-Over. 
This more general constraint refers to classes of rules, rather than 
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to specific rules. We do not have a rule-specific global constr_ai_IJt, 
for the data cited follow from the rule-general ~lobal co_nstraint 
Controller· Cross-Over. ,-
2. Greek Case-Agreement. 
Andrews (1971) argues that in Greek 'a predicate modifier agrees 
vith that ·NP which was its sub,1ect at the end of the first cycle 
applying to that predicate modifier' (147). Notice the examples
(2)-(6). 
(2) 	 Tauta dikia estin.  
(nom,) (nom.)  
'these things just be 1  
'These things are just.'  
(3) 	 Tauta legetai d1kaia einai. 
these things-are said- just - be 
'These things are said to be just.• 
(4) 	 Ismen tauta legomena d1kaia einai. 
(acc.) (acc.) (acc.) 
we know - these things - being said - just - be 
1We know these things to be said to be just.' 
(5) 	 Emm~nomen toi'.itois ha rsmen legomena 
(da.) (~c.) (acc.) 
we abide-by those things - which - we know - being said 
d1kai einai. 
(acc.) 
just-be 
1We abide by those things which we know are said to 
be just. 1 
(6) 	 Emmenomen hois 1smen legomenois dika1ois einai. 
(dat.) (acc.) (acc.) 
'We abide by what we know is said to be just.' 
In (3) tauta and d1kaia agree although tauta has undergone Raisinp, 
and Passive. In (4) tauta and leg6mena agree where tauta has 
undergone Raising, Passive, and Raising again. This indicates 
agreement takes place at a late level. But in (6) toi'.itois is 
optionally deleted from the structure that underlies (5), and as a 
result the relative pronoun becomes dative (hois). The adjectives 
and participles switch to dative, although they are not in the right 
configuration for the agreement rule which gives a predicate modifier 
the same case as the NP it modifies. Case marking takes place at 
a late level, but an earlier level must be examined in order to 
tell what NP a modifier is to agree with. (This example is also 
discussed in Lakoff (1970), (1972), Emonds (1973); Baker and Brame 
(1972), and Perry (1973)·.) · 
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3. French Adjective/Participle Agreement. 
Casagrande (1970) di_scusses glolml rules in regard to grammatical 
agreement. He discusses Greek case agreement (see 2 above) and 
proposes a similar solution to the problem of ·agreement of adjectives 
and past participles in French. An example of agreement of· 
adjectives is given in (7), of part participles in (8). The under-
lined elements agree in gender and number. 
(7) 	 Marie est jeune. 'Marie is young'. 
(8) 	 Haun les avons toujours admirees.  
1 We have always admired them.'  
Casagrande argues that there is a single agreement rule for adjectives 
and past particples. This rule must occur after any object placement 
rule, for a pa.st participle agrees with its direct.object only if 
the direct object precedes the past participle. There are two 
object placement rules, a syntactic rule which moves pronominal NP, 
and a stylistic rule which moves full NP. The agreement rule then 
is as follows: The adjectival element of a deep etre-verb agrees (in 
gender and number) with its deep subject NP and the adjectival 
element of a deep avoir-verb agrees with its deep direct object if 
that object is to the left of the adjectival element in question. 
Agreement applies after rules which permute direct objects, but 
must ma.~e reference to the notions deep subject and deep object. 
·The rule must therefore be global in nature. 
It appears as if the two constraints just discussed mention 
specific rules. I suspect, however, that no.global constraints in 
syntax are rule-specific. This means that an apparent rule-
spe~ific global constraint is either an instance of a general 
constraint or it is not global in nature. 
If the Greek example is considered in isolation, it appears 
to require a rule-specific constraint. However, when the Greek 
and French examples are considered together, it is obvious that the 
same phenomenon is exhibited in both cases: some node is stipulated 
as' agreeing with some other node at an early level, but the actual 
assignment of those features for which agreement is marked must 
t~ke pl~ce at a later level. The rule of case agreement in Greek 
and the rule of gender/number agreement in French are different · 
rules, but both exhibit the same global phenomenon. We need to 
view case agreement and gender /number agreement as s.eparate rules, 
for if" they were the same rule, we would. predict the1.t a language 
either has that rule or not. Yet there are some languages, such 
as Frencn, which have gender/number agreement but do not have case 
agreement. ,lot ice, for example, (9) and (10). 
(9) 	 Je crois qu' _!l est fameux.  
'I believe that he is famous. I  
(10) 	 Je le crois etre fameux.  
I I believe him to be famous. I  
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The adjective fa.meux agrees in gender and number with its ante-
cedent, but not·in case. There simply a.re no varying case forms 
for adjectives in French. 
Also, 	in languages that have syntactic gender--like French--the 
case form of a pronoun is governed by its grammatical relation to 
the verb, but the gender/number form of the pronoun is governed by 
its antecedent. Notice (11) and (12). 
(11) 	 Jfai trouve le crayon, et il eta.it rouge. 
'I found the pencil, and it was red. 1 
(12) 	 Marie a perdu le crayon, et je l'ai trouve. 
'Marie lost the pencil, and If~ it. 1 
In (11) ll is masculine singular, to agree with its underlined 
antecedent. But although the antecedent is a direct object, the 
pronoun is in the nominative form. In (21) le (contracted) I 
-	 J
masculine singular to agree with its antecedent. Le is accusative 
because it is itself a direct object rather than b-;;ause the 
antecedent is a direct object. Assignment of case and agreement of 
gender and number must be separate. 
We can therefore view the French and Greek cases as instances 
of a general global condition which refers to a class of agreement 
processes. This condition would specify that if two nodes are part 
of some agreement process which must be stated at an early level, 
the features that the controlling element bears in surface structure 
.will be assigned to the element that agrees with it. Thus, we do 
not have here an instance of a rule-specific global constraint. 
There 	is some debate as to whether the relevant constraint is 
actually global. Fa.ucon·nier (1971) presents an analysis where no 
global constraint is required. There has been objection to 
Fa.uconnier 1 s proposal on the grounds that it requires use of 
indexing, which extends.the power of the theory. However, because 
the matter is still in debate, I summarize Fauconnier 1 s proposal. 
Whether or not Fauconnier's analysis can be maintained, we certainly 
do not have a rule-specific global constraint. 
Fauconnier (1971) argues that there are unexpanded indexed 
nodes 	in deep structure and that adjectives may become pa.rt of a 
network of coreference by virtue of an agreement rule which copies 
the index of a noun phrase onto an adjective. He provides argumenta-
tion that the use of unexpanded NP nodes can handle the problems 
involving definite descriptions discussed in McCavley (1970), 
Karttunen (1969, 1971), and Kuroda (1971). 
Fauconnier (1971, 1973) argues that facts concerning Agreement, 
Quantifier Floating, and Pronominalization in French can be 
accounted for only by use of unexpanded indexed NP nodes, along 
with a process of index-copying. This approach will also account 
for the facts motivating the two global constraints presented. 
The most important parts of Fauconnier 1 s proposal are as 
follovs: 
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(a) 	 There is an adjective agree~ent rule of roughly the 
form: 
S .D. : 	 NP - V' - A
X 
s.c.: 	 NPx· - V' - AX 
Here V1 is a copulative predicate, A is an adjective or participle. 
The rule copies the index of the NP onto the adjective. This is a 
formal way of specifying. that the adjective is under the control of 
that NP. 
(b) 	 There is a rule of Feature-copying of the form: 
Copy the features of a noun phrase NPx onto all 
nodes Wx that are coreferential with NPx and not 
already marked for those features. 
(c) 	 There is a Closeness Constraint on feature-copying. 
First, we need the devinition: 'Node Bis closer to node C than node 
A is, if the iowest S dominating A, B, and C dominates the lowest S 
'dominating Band C1 (Fauconnier 1971: 144), Then·the constraint is 
defined as: 	 · 
Closen~ss Constraint: Given two coreferential NP's, UP1x 
and NP x• both marked for the feature F, and an unmarked 
node V x with the same index, if NP2x ts closer to V x than 
uplx is, then feature'copying of a :feature specification 
for F cannot operate between NPlx and Vx, 
Fauconnier motivates the Closeness Constraint on the basis of  
anaphoric definite descriptions and epithets in English and French  
{146-9), the 'accusativus cum infinitivo' construction in Latin  
{149-54), and relative claus~ reduction in Latin (154-60),  
Fauconnier summarizes the Lakoff-Andrews data concerning Greek 
and proposes that agreement does not actually copy any features, it 
1 only establishes control relations between noun phrases, adjectives 
and participles' (161). Case-marking is a late.rule and therefore 
all nodes bearing the sam~ referential index will share the surface 
features of the antecedent node. 
Fauconnier analyzes the examples concerning Greek case agreement 
in the following way. The common deep Structure of (5) and (6) is 
(13) 	{= Fauconnier's (46), p. 162). 
( 
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. s .... 
~o~ 
(NPy) VP 
I. /~ 
'we' V DAT 
I I 
emmenomen / NP
1
x""-
N s1
I /~ 
tau.ta (NPy) VP 
ismen s2 
I~ 
(NPz)/ "VP 
~leg/S~ 
NP2x A einai 
I
dikai 
The A node in s3 receives the index of NP2x, and NP2x is then raised 
in S2 and pa.ssivized. At this point legomen is indexed to agree with 
NP2x· Again NP2x is raised, and finally comes to rest in s1 • The 
result is (14) (• (47), p. 163), 
(14) 
The rule which distinguishes (5} from (6} replaces tauta by NP2x, 
Suppose this rule does not apply, Then NPlx is marked dative since 
emmenomen governs this case. NP2x, being in object position, is 
marked accusative. The case of NPlx shows up on·its head (tauta) 
and case of NP2x on the relative pronoun. Feature-copying can now 
apply,. and since NP2x is closer than NPlx to Px and Ax these latter 
13c3 
. . .... 
··two. will receive the case feeiure• of Ni?x ·(nemely•[~ccusativej) • 
by th~ Cfoseness Constrafot. The res~t •fs ( 5) • . 
· But suppose the replacement· rul~ substitutes NP2x for tauta • 
. The res~],t is (J.5) (= (48), p, 164). 
(15) /So~ 
emmenomen • · DAT  
. -1 '  
NI>\ .. 
--~ 
2 . 
' 
NP x s1.......,_  
I / "'-
+p1ur;J S:smen VP 
[ +neut. ~ 
. Px VP 
I ./~
legomen Ax einai . - I 
di~ai_ 
In this tree, NPlx is marked [dativeJ and this feature appears 
on its head NP2x· In his event, Feature-copying marks Px and Ax 
[datiyeJ, and t~e result is (6). . 
It seems to me that· F;auconnier is· not arbitrarily assigning 
indices to certain nodes in order to keep trac;k. of them, as -Baker 
and Brame (1972) do. The point is the.t during a derivation a network 
o.f coreference is ·established between certain nodes·, and Featur.e-
markinp; takes place on the. basis of this network of.coreference. 
According to Fauconnier no rule-specific global c6nstraint·is needed. 1 
Fauconi-iier•s analysis can aiso.be appl:i.ed to .French agreement. 
In French a pa.rticiple agrees in gender and number· vi th an ob,1 ect 
if and only if the 9bject precedes the partic.ipie. But the 
structural description for. agreement. is always_ met before and not 
after the object moves, which led Casagrande t9 propose·a p,loba.l 
constraint. Fauconnier (1971, 1973) shows that adjectiv~· a.greeJ11ent 
must be an indexing transformation. The situ,ation with oast 
participles is parallel, so he formulates Object~Participle. /\.greement 
as an indexin~ rule: 
(16) S.D.: Aux - CPyJ - NPx 
s.c.: P becomes Px 
. ./ 
F'eatµre.:.,,copying (FC) is responsible _not only for the features 9f 
adje~tives_ and participles, but for th~ lexic~~ forms of· pronouns. 
Certain constra~nts on anaphora, as well as other facts, can be 
exnlained if FC obeys the_Ross-Langacker constraint. 2 (17a) is 
de~i ,;•ed from ( 17b } as foll<?WS • 
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(17) a. ,Jer~::. Jai r~!::·s]. 
l_plur. G,1ur. 
V 	 NP·I i~ 
ai P plur.J
I [ fem. 
pris 
Indexing changes P to Pi. NPi is moved to precede Pi. Then FC  
copies the features of NPi onto the participle Pi. Notice that (18)  
has an underlying structure similar to (17b).  
(18) J'ai pris les sacoches. 
[no features] [ fem. J 
1 I took the bags.' 
But no rule moves NPi (it is not a pronoun), and FC cannot apply,  
since Pi precedes and commands NPi.  
Fauc.onnier offers several other considerations (119-122) 
which indicate that his proposal is superior to that offered by 
Casagrande. I shall not repeat the details, for what concerns me 
here is that no rule-specific global constraint is needed. 
By using rule-specific global rules we claim that each constraint 
is an idiosyncratic fact about some particular language. Fauconnier 
claims that a number of facts about separate languages can be 
explained by the general processes that languages may draw on in 
constructing their grammars. This solution, in view of its widespread 
motivation in different languages, is superior to the Baker and 
Brame (1972) indexing proposal. There they assign arbitrary indices 
only in order to mark nodes as being within the same simple S. But 
Fauconnier uses referential indices which are needed anyway in 
accounting for definite descriptions. Such naturally limited use 
of indices does not intolerably extend the power of grammars, and 
the advantage is that the two examples discussed here automatically 
follow from a more general analysis. 
The above discussion opens up a number of problems due to the 
debatable status of indexing in grammar. A more insightful analysis 
may well show that indexing is not necessary, but in any case the 
examples .of agreement do not require use of rule-specific global 
constraints. 
4. 	 'Obligatory' Extraposition.  
Verbs like~. appear, happen, strike, etc. (which I will  
·refer 	to as ~-class verbs) cannot appear in certain grammatical 
structures which have not undergone Extraposition. 
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(19) 	 a. It seeins to nie that Louise is a good cook. 
b, *That Louise is a good cook seems to me. 
(20) 	 a, It appears to me that Harry will win. 
b. *That Harry will win appears to me. 
Extraposition is ordinarily optional: 
(21) 	 That Jean-Pierre is a revolutionary is well-known. 
We cannot account for (19) and (21) by making Extraposition obligatory 
for seem-class verbs. For the sentences in (22) are grammatical, 
where Raising has applied (to the structures underlying (23)) but 
not Extraposition. 
(22) a. John seems to please you. 
b. Watson happened to be in London. 
(23) a, [John please you] seems 
b. [Watson be in London] happened 
Furthermore, we cannot say that Extraposition must apply if appli-
cable, for there are cases like (24b) and (25b) where Extranosition 
has not a:pplied. 
(24) 	 a; It seems strange that Betty can't tapdance. 
b. That Betty can't tapdance seeMs strange. 
(25) 	 a. It appears (to be) tTue that Winchell cheats 
at tic-tac-toe. 
b. 	 That Winchell cheats at tic-tac-toe apnears 
to be true. 
Postal (1972a) discusses the above problems, and tries to find a 
solution using rule-features. AssuminV, that the rule-feature 
assigned to the verb by Extraposition is [~xtraJ and the one 
assigned by the rule marking a complement as a that-clause (as 
opposed to an infinitive or gerund) is [that J, the constrain·t is: 
(26) 	 Throw out all derivations in which the verbs 
~. aopear, ha nen, etc. occur with the 
feature markings -Extra].
+That 
This rules out (19b) and (20b) but allows (22), (24) and (25). Of 
course this proposal won't work, as Postal himself points out, 
because Extraposition is obligatory even when a seem-class verb 
is embedded 	and has its subject NP raised, as in"l'2'f). 
(27) 	 a. *That Harry threw the game is likely to seem. 
b. It is likely to seem that Harry threw the ~rune. 
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Since Extra-position applies to the clause containing the verb 
likelv, rather tha.ri the clause containing the verb seem, the verb 
seeni is nia.rked [-Extra] and (26) wronglypredicts that both (27a) 
and (27b) are ungrammatical. Postal therefore has no solution. 
The problem is that Postal is trying to find conditions that 
make Extra.position obligatory. This does violence to the distinction 
between optional and obligatory. An obligatory rule is one in 
which no derivation is acceptable where that rule has not applied 
( if its structural descriptj_on was met at soine point in the derivation). 
An optional rule is one in which any derivation is accer>table in 
which that rule has not applied. Now if some derivation is blocked 
because an optional rule has not applied, then we violate the 
definition above of optional and meet the definition above of 
obligatory. We would have to create more complicated definitions 
of the notions 'optional' and 1 obligatory 1 which would rob them of 
their generality and simplicity. Furthermore, suppose we adopted 
more complicated redefinitions which would allow a rule to be either 
optional or obligatory under certain circumstances. It then becomes 
impossible to state that any given rule either is or is not 
obligatory. If some rule appears to be optional, that may be 
because no one has found conditions where it is obligatory. And 
if some rule appears to be obligatory, it may really be optional, 
with the conditions. engendering obligatoriness so numerous that no 
one has found examples of optional application. The distinction 
optional/obligatory becomes useless. We might ,1ust as easily speak 
of the conditions under which a rule can apply. The way Postal uses 
the term 'obligatory' it becomes devoid of meaning. 
In addition, Posta.1 1 s use of ad hoc feature markings like 
[Extra] provides no way to explain why the features are used that 
a.re used. Any arbitrarily selected set of features should be 
available. Postal 1 s solution carries with it the claim that the 
constraint might in other dialects of English mention any two 
randomly selected rules, a highly unnatural claim. 
Postal notes that both Raising and Extra.position give acceptable 
sentences, but fails to draw the proper.conclusion from this fact. 
'l'he real question is: What is it that Raising has done to make 
the surface forms ac·ceptable that Extra.position also does? Once 
the question is phrased this way, the solution is obvious. They 
place an NP or VP after the matrix verb. Seem-class predicates 
always have a surface form in which either an NP, VP, or adjective 
follows the verb. Seem-class predicates do not appear as the 
rightmost element o~sentence in surface structure. One does find 
sentences like *John is except under the existential reading of the 
predicate be. 
I propose that there is a surface structure constraint which  
throws out structures not of the form:  
V1(28) NP - - X - { ::} 
where V' is a seem-class predicate. This constraint blocks (19b),  
(20b), and (27a). But it allows (19a), (20a), (22), (24), (25),  
and (27b).  
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.There are sentences like John seems rich and John appears 
hapoy vhere an adjective follovs the verb. But these are derived 
from· John seems to be rich and John appears to be happy, which 
indicates that the constraint holds at 'shallow structure' before 
the minor rule which deletes to be •. If this is so, we can eliminate 
the curly brackets in (28) by specifying that there must be some 
constituent following the matrix verb which itself contains a verb. 
Or perhaps it is best to say that a major constituent must follow the 
verb, where a major constituent is one which results from the first 
expansion of the S-node by the phrase-structure rules. In any 
event, no global constraint is needed. 
5. Say. 
Lakoff (1970) claims that if the verb say takes a for-to 
complementizer, it must undergo Raising, Passive, and Agent Deletion. 
(29). a. *Sam said for John to be tall. 
b. *Sam 	said John to .be tall. 
c. *John is said to be tall by Sam. 
d. John is said to be tall. 
Lakoff claims that a global constraint is needed here, but it would 
have many complications in its statement. A global constraint 
throvs out certain derivations a.s· ill-formed, so in order to mark 
(29a-c) as ungrammatical, the constraint would have to be stated 
as: Throw out any derivation in which (a} the verb §,N_ appears in 
the matrix sentence, (b) the complement sentence takes a for-to 
complementizer, and either (c) Raising applies, or (d) both Raising 
and Passive apply, but not Agent Deletion. Such a formulation fails, 
of course, to state what conditions (c) and (d) have in common. 
A similar approach is taken by Stockwell, Schachter and Partee 
(1973, cf. pp. 530-1, 560-1), who present a derivation of (29d) which 
is the same as Lakoff's. They calim that (29b) can be blocked by 
making Passive obligatory with Raising. There are serious theoretical 
problems with such a position, namely the problems of making an 
optional rule obligatory (discussed in section 4) and the use of a 
rule-specific global constraint. Furthermore, I think the Lakoff/ 
Stockwell spproach is based on a false analogy with sentences like 
(30) which undergo Raising and Passive in their derivation which 
follows. 
(30) a. One believes [Lloyd is the fastest gun in the 
West]. 
-+ b. One believes Lloyd to be the fastest gun in·~ 
the West. 
+ 	 C • ·Lloyd is believed by one to be the fastest f;':Uil 
in the West. 
-+ 	 d. Lloyd is believed to be the fastest gun in the 
West .. 
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What is ignored here is the grouping of verbs into lexical 
classes. Baker and Brame insightfully point out that say can be 
broken up into two lexical items,~ and~- ~ occurs in 
(31), and~ in (29d) and (32). 
(31) Hermoine said that Marcelle tickled her rancy. 
(32) It is said that John is tall. 
Baker and Brame then claim (incorrectly, I think) that Extraposition 
is obligatory for~: 
(33) *That John is tall is said. 
They propose that be.said is generated as a Passive by the base 
rules, and adopt Emond's analysis of complementation, ·so that be 
said has an empty subject NP and Intraposition (the reverse of-
Extraposition) is blocked. But Postal (1972c) provides extensive 
argumentati,on against replaping Extraposition by Intraposition, and 
Lakoff'(l972) discusses the arbitrary nature of empty nodes. 
Lakoff's remarks in this regard are much to the point, but both 
parties in the dispute focus on.formal devices and not insight into 
grrum:natical phenomena. 
The ~lue to what is going .on appears when Baker and Brame say: 
1There are a number of respects in which be said and rumored behave 
like predicates such as~ 
then, that is said is a pred
as in {34). 
and appear• (67). 
icate which takes a 
It is plausible, 
sentential subject, 
( 34) s 
~p ------I 
S 
VP --------~ 
is said 
~ 
John BE tall 
If Raising applies, {29) results, if Extraposition applies, (32) 
results. If neither applies, the surface structure constraint (28) 
discussed in section 4 throws out (35). 
(35) *That John is tall is said. 
(29a-c) are blocked because while .!!!lJ.. takes an object complement, 
that complement cannot have a stative predicate if it bears a!£!.-
. to complernentizer: 
{know the answer}(36) a. *Sam said for John to be tall • 
b. Sam said for John to open the door. 
{knew the answer}.c. Sam said that John 
'W"BS tall 
(36b) is .all right because open is a non"'.'i;tati.ve pr~d:i.cat~. The 
verb in (29a-:-c) coaj.d n.ot be ~, pecaµs13 that predicate does not 
take an object complement. We now have more evidence against Lakoff's 
proposal: since the deep structure of (29) :is ill-formed due to the 
constraint on stative predicates demonstrated in (36), how could the 
application of )Y transformations (much less a list of specific 
transformations make the surface sentence acceptable? I conclude 
that there is no global constraint here, rather that what we have 
is simply a case of the more general restriction for ~-class 
predicates developed in 4. 
6. 	 Double-Ing. 
Ross (1972) argues that there is a derivational constraint 
which rules out certain sequences of present participles. 
that (37d) is unacceptable. 
Notice 
(37) a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
It continued to rain. 
It continued raining. 
It is continuing to rain. 
*It is continuing raining, 
Ross first shows that the Double-Ing constraint must be an output 
condition: there are some intermediate stages where such sequences 
must be allowed. But the constraint also has to refer to earlier 
levels of structure. To begin with, the seconding form has to be 
a verb in the complement of the first verb. There is no violation 
in (38) because the seconding form is a noun, and no violation in 
(39) 	because the seconding is not in the complement of the first. 
(38) The police are stopping drinking on campus. 
(39) 	 I saw the man who had been drinking opening up 
the cash register. 
Furthermore, notice that (41), derived from (40) by Raisin~, is 
acceptable. 
(40) 	 His is expecting that breathing deeply will 
benefit us is naive~ 
(41) 	 His expecting breathing deeply·to benefit us 
is naive. 
(41) is acceptable because the constraint blocks only contiguous 
verbs that were in immediately adjacent clauses in remote structure. 
The deep structure of the subject of (41) is as in (42), where 
expecting (=Vi) and breathing (•V3 ) are not in adjacent clauses. 
(42) /s1 ~ 
NP V1 NP 
I I I 
be expects / s2~ 
NP will V2 NP 
I I I 
usL.	S3~nefit, 
NP V3 deeply 
I I 
we breathe 
Ross formalizes the Double-Ing constraint as follows: 
(43) 	 All surface structures containing a subtree of the 
form, 
in which the node corresponding to Va in remote 
structure was immediately dominated by Si, and 
the node corresponding to Vb in remote str.ucture 
was immediately dominated by Sj, and in which no 
Snode intervened in remote structure between 
Si and SJ, are ungrammatical. 
This formulation of the Doubl-Ing Constraint has been amply 
criticized by Pullum (ms,) who offers a solution which does not 
require a global constraint. Pullum first summarizes the proposals 
by Emonds (1973) and Milsark (1972) that the constraint may be 
stated without reference to derivational history. In essence, they 
both propose that surface sequences of V-ing's are prohibited unless 
an NP boundary intervenes. They give evidence that there is no NP 
node in surface structure over the complement of a verb of temporal 
aspect, so that (44) is blocked. 
(44) *John is continuing singing soprano arias, 
But there is an NP node over the ing forms that have traditionally 
----- ----
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been called gerunds, so (45) i"s not blocked. 
(45)_ John was considering getting int:o college. 
Emond's constraint will allow (38), (39), and (41) because an NP 
dom_inates the second ing form that does not also dominate the first. 
Pullum then presents counterexamples to Emond 1 s constraint (sentences 
from Pullum's ms., p. 7). 
(46) a. 
b. 
T
I 
hree policemen dragged the screaming, struggling 
girl away. 
was sitting thinking about my troubles when 
there was a knock at the door. · 
In these sentences there is no NP node over one of the ing forms 
that is not also over the other, so (46a) and (46b)- shoill be blocked. 
The problem is that Emends tries to state the constraint in terms 
of surface sequences of categories, rather than in terms of a 
phrase marker. 
Pullum presents strong evid_ence against a global statement of 
the Double-Ing constraint. The remote structure of (47) must include 
something like the substructure (48). 
(47) 	 He was charged with numerous offences, including 
stealing apples and assaulting the Queen. 
(48) 
s 
NP 	 VP 
I -------------NP0 rfences V 
I I 
include s 
~ 
NP VP. 
I 	 ~ 
he V NP 
I l 
steal apples 
The surface structure of (47) must include a substructure of the 
form given in (43), ·with including as Va and stealing as Vb. Ross' 
constraint wrongly predicts that (47) is blocked. 
Emonds (45) points out that it may be a general property of 
surface structure constraints that they do not prohibit a sequence 
of items when an NP boundary occurs between them. Pullum suggests 
that if this is the case, the Doubl-Ing Constraint may be stated as: 
(49) Any sequence.y.EV +: ingJv. -·v CV + inglv 
1 1 J . . j 
in surface structure is ungrammatical if 
VJ is in the complement of Vi. 
We may conclude that this constraint is not a global constraint. 
7. One-Pronominalization. 
Lakoff (1970} discusses a constraint which biocks structures 
roughly of the form one of NP under certain conditions. But the 
constraint does not hold if ones is spelled those in surface structure 
(by application of an optionalmorphophonemic rule vhich.~onverts the 
~ into those). Thus, ve have the contrast betveen: 
(50) 	 a. Max had known the kings of England and I had 
known the ones of Spain. 
b•.Max had knovn the kings of England and I had 
known those of Spain. 
Lakoff claims that the constraint must refer to an intermediate 
level of structure, as well as to surface structure, because the 
constraint must precede the rule of One(s)-deletion, which derives 
{ 51a) from {-51b). 
(51) 	 a. *-I knew six girls from England and Irv knew 
five ones from Spain. 
b. 	 I knew six girls from England and Irv knew 
five from Spain. 
Lakoff maintains that the constraint must apply before one(s)-deletion 
in the derivation of (52b), for only at the. point where (52b) is 
identical to (52a) is the structure defining the constraint present. 
(52) 	 a. *I knew six kings of England and Irv knew five 
ones of Spain. 
b. 	*I knew six kings of England and Irv knew five 
of Spain. 
Lakoff also claims that the constraint must precede the rule of 
Pseudo-Adjective Formation (which converts, for example, king of 
Spain to Spanish king) in order to rule out (53). 
(53) *I me~ 	the English king and Sam met the Spanish one. 
The evidence for referring to surface structure comes from 
(50). Now if we did not need to refer to intermediate stages, the 
constraint would be a surface structure constraint. But do we 
really need to refer to earlier structures?. The evidence that the 
constraint must hold before certain rules comes from examples (51)~ 
(52), and (53). But I think all these can be blocked by other 
restrictions than Lakoff1 s. (51a) and (52a) can be blocked by an 
independently-needed restriction which prohibits structures in which 
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ones is preceded by a qu~ntifier of the class including numerals 
and items ~uch as these, those,~'~. Notice the examples 
in (54) . 
(54) a. *I kissed five girls and George kissed six ones. 
f"omeb. 	*I kissed many girls and George kissed many r 
a whole room-
\., ful of 
ones. -· 
(52b) and (53) can be blocked in the following way. Baker and 
Brame give some indication (55) that there is a structural difference 
between NP like king of England and NP like a picture of Mary. It 
seems that king of England is dominated by the node NP. Notice that 
there are sentences like (55), where one of NP occurs, indicating 
that an N under the domination of NP has been reduced to ~- · 
(55) 	 John took a picture of Mary, and I took one of 
Alice. 
But phr.ases like the king of England and Man of La Mancha are single 
nouns in some sense, as indicated by the difference between (55) ~nd 
(56). 
(56). I met the Man of La Mancha and George met 
the man of the year}. 
{*the one of the year 
Now suppose that the NP's in (52b) and (53) 	have the structures 
shown in (52b 1 ) and (53'). 
( 52b I) 	 s 
/ 
six kings of England five kings of Spain 
(53 I) 	 s 
NP1 · 
/ "' 	 /NP~  Det ~Hl Det LN2 
I L__ ~ I ~ 
the Engli~h kinB the Spanish king 
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The rule of One-Pronominalization can apparently apply to both NP 
and N nodes: 
(57) Alice bought a blue dress, and Harriet bought 
{one, 	too }.  
a ~een one  
But the rule cannot apply to (53'), because NP2 and NP1 do not meet 
any identity condition, nor do N2 and N1, so (53) cannot be generated, 
The situation is the same with NP2 and N2 in (52b
1 ). Since One-
Pronominalization can't apply, neither can One-Deletion, so (52b) 
can't be generated. The structural distinction between NP's like 
the English king and the cheerful lady is supported by the following 
considerations. Notice that One-Pronominalization can apply to (58). 
(58) a. I met the generous king and Sam met the mean king. 
b. I rret the ~enerous king and Sam met the mean one. 
Now suppose the NP 1s in (59) are as in (60), 
(59) I met the English king and Sam met the mean king . 
.(60) 	 s 
/NP1~  
Det N1  
/·~
the· English king the mean king 
Now sinC;e N2 and N1 do not meet an identity condition, we should 
expect that N2 cannot pronominalize to~' and this is just what 
we find: 
(61) 	*I met the English king and Sam met the mean one. 
This sentence can not be blocked by Lakoff 1s constraint, for vhile 
it has a superficial structural similarity to (53), the NP the mean 
one cannot be derived from *one of mean. 
-- In fact, (50a) can be blocked by the same means used to block 
(52b) and (53), Perhaps no one of NP constraint is necessary, only 
a restriction against c:0111bining ~ with an immediately preceding 
quantifier (illustrated by sentences (51a), (52a), and (54)). Baker 
and Brame (1972, 54-5) provide evidence against the rule changing 
the ones to ~, further vitiating Lakoff 1 s proposal. This · 
example therefore cannot be maintained as a global cons·traint. 
8. 	*Numerous such ones. 
Postal (1972a) proposes the filter: 
150 
(62) 	 Throw out all derivations in which the substructure 
NP[nwnerous such onesJNP occurs. 
Postal derives one forms from such forms. Thus the (b) sentences in 
(63) and (64) are derived from the resnective (a) sentences. 
{63) a. John was looking for a yellow robin, but he 
couldn't find such a one. 
+ b. John was looking for a yellow robin but he 
couldn't find one. 
(64) 	 a. Smith was searching for non-returnable boomerangs, 
but he couldn't find any such ones, 
+ 	 b. Smith was searching for non-returnable boomerangs, 
but he couldn't find ·any such. 
The filter blocks sentences like: 
(65) 	 a. *Harry needed atomic ray guns and George sold him 
numerous. 
b. 	*Harry needed atomic ray guns and George sold him 
numerous such+ (*ones). 
The sentences in (65) are acceptable if we replace numerous with 
many. (62) refers only to a single tree, but this cannot be a surface 
structure tree since no such appears in (65b). The filter is unusual 
in that it is a single tree filter that is not stated at either deep 
or surface structure. 
Postal notes, correctly, that the constraint cannot be a surface 
structure constraint, since in some forms~ does not appear, and 
in others such does not appear. But from this one cannot logically 
conclude, as Postal does, that the constraint must be stated at some 
level or levels of intermediate structure. Postal dismisses the 
possibility of a deep structure constraint with the comment 'No non-
ad hoc way of preventing generation of the underlying structures 
appears to exist,·especially in view of the normal distribution of 
the closely related form many' (149), But an ad hoc deep structure 
constraint is surely preferable to an ad hoc constraint of a new 
type. (Remember, this constraint would be odd as a global rule,. 
for it does not relate corresponding structures at nonadjacent 
~oints in a derivation.) And in all of the blocked sentences, the 
banned structure *numerous such ones appears in something very much 
like d_eep structure. Furthermore, it has by no means been 
demonstrated that the deep st.ructure blocking does not have to do 
with the semantics of numerous as opposed to man~. This filter ~ay 
be removed from the class of elobal constraints. 
9. Each Shift. 
Postal (1972c) presents a derivational constraint on the rule 
of Each Shift, which 'has the effect of moving the quantifier each 
out of the NP corresponding to the variable which each binds~ 
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attaching it to (or after) the end of a (usually) numerically 
quantified NP whose numerical quantifier is under the scope of
4each' 	{189). Examples of the rule are.: 
{66) 	 a. Each of the boys kissed her three times. 
b, The boys kissed her three times each. 
(67) 	 a. I gave each of them five dollars. 
b. I 	 gave them five dollars each. 
One NP {the each-Source) is moved to the end of another (the each-
Target) at the point of application. 
(68) 	 a. He sent three men to each of the stores, 
b, *He sent three men each· to the stores. 
Furthermore, there is a clause-mate condition on Each Shift. In 
the sentences in (69), there is a clause boundary after~. and 
each may not hop over this boundary. 
(69) 	 a. I talked to each of the senators about {my) 
blocking three bills, 
b. 	*I talked to the senators about (my) blocking 
three bills each. 
c. 	 I talked to each of the advisers about displaying 
three pictures of myself. 
d. 	*I talked to the advisers about displaying three 
pictures of myself each. 
There are two significant restrictions here: (a) the requirement 
that each-Source precede each-Target, (b) the Clause Mate condition. 
Now notice that unbounded leftward movement rules (like Topicalization, 
Adverb Preposing, Wh Rel Movement) can move NP 1 s so that Each Shift 
can.apply, even when it could not apply in the structures which were 
input to those rules. 
(70) 	 a. Harry bought three diamonds for each of those 
girls. 
b. *Harry bought three diamonds each for those girls. 
c. For those girls, Harry bou~ht three diamonds each, 
d•.The girls, for whom Harry bought three diamonds 
each, are happy. 
The relevant movement rules are unbounded.5 Notice, for example, 
Adverb Preposing: 
(71) 	 a. For those girls, I em sure Harry bought three 
diamonds each. 
b, 	 For those girls, it was later learned that Mary 
claimed that he bought three diamonds each, 
15? 
Bringing the facts a.bout Each Shift together, we notice that the 
condition that each-Source precede each-Target is defined on the 
oi:i.tput of unbounded movement rules. (as shown in (70) and (71)), 
but the clause-mate condition could only be met before the application 
of these rules,6 Postal 1 s account is that Each Shift is postcyclic, 
subject to a left-right condition. The Cl~use Mate requirement is 
a global condition referring to earlier stages of a derivation. That 
is, the correspondents of each-Source and each-Target must be Clause 
Mates at the end of the lowest cycle covering both of them. 
But I think the logic of this argument is faulty, for Postal 
is trying to build two restrictions into one rule. Such a move would 
perhaps be necessary if (a), the condition that each-Source precede 
each-Target is applicable only to the rule of Each Shift, (b) this 
condition is defined at the point of application of the rule Each 
Shift. I think that both of these assumptions should be called into 
question, thereby vitiating an analysis based upon them. 
There is some interesting data given in Fauconnier (1971: 7~10,. 
171-95) which bears on the first assumption. There is a rule of 
Quantifier Floating (QF) in French which derives (73) from (72). 
(72) Chacun des hommes a vu 1 1.auto. 
(73) Les 	hommes ont chacun vu 1 1 auto. 
Both (72) and (73) mean 'each of the men saw the car'. QF says jn 
brief: In a clause containing (prep) <ig~~un} NP, move (prep) <ig~~un} 
into post-auxiliary or postverbal position. Fauconnier notes (p. 10) 
that the remaining NP must precede the detached chacun: 
(74) 	 a. J 1ai mange chacun des gateaux. 
'I ate each of the cakes' 
+ b. *J'ai chacun mange les gateaux. 
The same condition holds on the paral'iel rule of Quantifier Floatinj! 
in English: 
(75) a. 	 I have seen each of those movies. 
+ b. *I have each seen those movies, 
The conditions here seem to be the same as the condition on Each 
Shift: the moved quantifier must follow the NP it moved off of. 
Since the same restriction applies to separate rules in separate 
languages, it is unlikely that it should be built into the rule of 
Each Shi ft _in English. 	 · 
F,urthermo:re, Fauconnier v,ives interesting data which indicate 
that the constraint could be viewed as a surface structure constraint: 
In French chacun or tous can be moved from an NP in object position 
only if the NP from which it moves is a pronoun which ends up as a 
clitic or relative pronoun, Thus compare (74b) with (76). 
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(76) 	 a. Je les ai chacun manges.  
'I ate. each of them'  
b. 	 Les gateaux gue j 1 ai cha.cun manges etaient bans. 
'The cakes which I ate were good' 
But the application of the separate rules of Clitic Movement and Wh 
Rel Movement will in (76) insure that the NP precedes its quantifier 
in surface structure. If the pronoun cannot be moved to the left of 
the quantifier, the surface structure is banned. Notice (77), .where 
the pronoun .!:E!. cannot be cliticized: 
(77) 	 a. J 1 a.i mange chacun d'eux.  
'I ate each of them'  
b. *J'ai chacun mange eux. 
c. *Je ~ ai chacun mange. 
The fact that separate rules create the acceptable sentences indicates 
that the constraint is stated at surface structure, for otherwise 
we could not explain why these separate rules both engender surface 
accepta.bility. We could, then, formulate a surface structure 
constraint which insures that a detached quantifier will follow the 
NP it is detached from. Roughly, the constraint would state: 
Block structures of the form Q - X - NP where Q is not immediately 
dominated by the node NP. The data motivating the left-right 
condition 	on Each Shift would automatically follow from the more 
general 	condition. Now since this condition is separate from the 
clause-mate 	condition on Each Shift, no global constraint is necessary. 
We are still missing something, it seems to me. This surface 
structure constraint is puzzling in view of the fact that non-detached 
quantifier precedes its NP. Perhaps the structures which we explained 
by use of a surface structure constraint actually result merely from. 
the say the rules operate. We then would not need a surface structure 
constraint, In this case, perhaps the reason all detached quantifiers 
follow their NP 1 s .is that the quantifier detachment·rules are 
rightward movement rules.7 (70b) is ruled out because the rule can't 
move each to the left, (70c), (70d), and (71a) are acceptable 
because the rules of ·Adverb Preposing and Wh Rel Movement carry the 
whole NP each of those girls to the left. After that, Each Shift 
moves each to the right, The derivation of (71a) is: 
(78) 	 a. I am sure Harry bought three diamonds for each 
of those girls. 
-+ b. For each of those girls, I 8lll sure Harry bought 
three diamonds. (Adverb Preposing) 
-+ 	 C • For those girls, I am sure Harry bought three 
diamonds ea.ch. (Each Shift) 
According to this derivation, we violate the Clause Mate condition 
on Each Shift. But the Clause Mate condition may well .be illusory. 
Postal cites (69) as evidence for a clause-mate condition. But Each 
Shift is independently blocked from moving each into the about-phrase 
after the verb talk: 
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(79) 	 a. I talked to each of the senators about five bills. 
-+ b. *I talked to the senators about five bills each. 
(80) 	 a. Each of the authors talked to the editor- about 
five books. 
-+ 	 b. '*The authors talked to the editor about five books 
each, 
No clause-mate condition can be invoked here. J. Geis argues that 
adverbial prepositional phrases originate as 'higher predicates' 
which take sentential subjects. If about Xis such an adverbial, 
then the deep structure of (79) is (81): 
Si ______(81) · :------
NP 	 VP 
S2 
about fiye bills 
I 	 /~
~ 
I talked to each  
of the senators  
(69) has a similar deep structure. But now we can easily see why  
Each Shift is blocked, for rightward movement rules are upward- 
bounded. (They may not move an element into a clause higher than  
the one they originated in. See Ross 1967: 146-84).) Therefore  
each cannot move out of S2 in (81).  
The only other evidence which could motivate a clause-mate  
condition would be a case where one Sis embedded within another,  
and the each in some NP of.the matrix sentence could move onto an  
each-Target in the lower sentence. If the movement is blocked, we  
could claim that there is a clause-mate condition. An example of this  
situation is (82).  
(82) a. Each of the farmers thinks that Zebe owns five 
acres. 
-+ b. *The farmers think that Zebe owns five acres each. 
But notice that in the exwnples (66) and (67) motivating the rule of  
Each Shift, the each-Source and each-Target command each other. In  
.(82a), however, each assymetrically commands five and precedes it. 
In (82b) each andfive command each other, but five precedes each. 
It is just such a situation which is blocked by Lakoff's Quantifier 
Constraint, which· specifies that if Q1 assymetrically commands Q2 
in deep structure, then if Q1 and Q2 command each other in surface 
structure, Q1 must precede Q2. 
Since we cannot motivate a clause-mate condition, we cannot 
assume there is one, and derivations of the type presented in (78) 
cannot be blocked. In such an event, Postal's data can be accounted 
for by the simple restriction that Each Shift is a rightward movement 
rule, along with other independently-needed restrictions in the grammar. 
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By focusing on the nature of the rules involved, we can explain 
what is going on- here, and we do not need to use a global constraint 
or a surface structure constraint. 
10. Indirect Ob ect Movement. 
Postal 1972a) points out that, as Fillmore (1965) first noticed, 
for-prepositional phrases behave differently with respect to Passive 
than do .12.-prepositional phrases, 
(83) a. Marsha gave a rose to Emily. 
b. Marsha gave Emily a rose, 
c. A rose was given to Marsha by Emily. 
d. Emily was given a rose by Marsha. 
(84) a. Emily bought a rose for Marsha, 
b. Emily bought Marsha a rose. 
c. A rose was bought for Marsha by Emily. 
d. *Marsha was bought a rose by Emily. 
Indirect Object Movement derives the (b) sentences from the (a) 
sentences in (83) and (84). Postal (1972a) claims that application 
of the rules Passive and IO Movement in a clause with a main verb Vi 
leads to assignment of the features [+Passive] and [+IO Movement] to 
Vi. The filter is: 
(85) 	 Throw out all derivations in which a single verb Va 
both: 
( i) occurs in an underlying structure with a f.E!:.-
indirect object; and 
(ii) 	occurs in a derived structure marked 
+Passive J 
[+IO Movement 
This is merely a restatement of the fact that no verb which has a 
for-indirect object can undergo both Passive and IO Movement. Constraint 
{85) mentions two specific rules, as well as the presence of a for-
indirect object as opposed to a .12.-indirect object, There is no 
difference in the structural configuration of these indirect objects: 
the difference is indicated by the preposition to as opposed to for. 
The trouble with Postal 1s constraint is the.t the distinction 
between to-indirect objects and for-indirect objects is not sufficient. 
Notice, for example (86a)-(86d) where a to-indirect object may not be 
moved, 
(86) a. John sang a new song to Mary, 
b. John sang Mary a new song. 
c. A new song was sung to Mary by John. 
d, *Mary was sung a new song by John. 
The generalization seems to be that both Passive and IO Movement 
occur with three-place predicates but not with two place predicates. 
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This is true of necessity because one argument is th.e subject of. the 
predicate, and. IO Movement can take place only when there are two 
arguments in the VP to be interchanged. A passivized indirect 
object does not appear with verbs that. a.re two-place predicates, 
like buy and sing. To see the distinction between two and three 
place predicates, notice (87)-(89). 
(87) *John gave a book. 
(88) John bought an apple. 
(89) John sang 'Keep on Truckin 1 • 
A sentence like (87) can occur only where the third argument has been 
deleted by some rule. Now if buy is a two-place predicate, why is 
it that {84a) appears to have an indirect object, and why does it 
look as if IO Movement has applied in (84c)? One possibility would 
be to claim that buy is a three-place predicate. Then the third 
argument in (88) is deleted by a rule of Indefinite Dative Deletion, 
similar to the way in which the indefinite direct object of the two-
place predicate read is deleted by Indefinite Object Deletion. 8 
(90) a. John was reading something. 
b. John was reading. 
The trouble is that while (90b) has the meaning of (90a), (88) does 
not have the meaning of the supposed source (91): 
(91) John bought an apple for someone. 
Another possibility is that verbs like buy: and sing may be 
optionally either two- or three-place predicates. But this does 
violence to the notion of saying that some verb is !1rl !!_-place predicate. 
If there is a verb which apparently differs in the number of arguments 
it can take, I claim that we actua1iy have two homophonous lexical 
items. Notice the verb rent is apparently either a two- or three-
place predicate: 
(92) · Albert rented a cabin. 
(93) Albert rented a cabin to the Quigleys. 
There is a difference in the meaning of the verb rent in (92) and 
the verb rent i.n (93). In (92) the subject of th;-;;ntence is paying 
money, butiii" (93) the subject is receiving money. (92) has another 
reading in which an indefinite dative to someone has been deleted, 
but this other reading is irrelevant. A promising way to account 
for this difference is to claim that it is based on the existence 
of two verbs ~: rent1 , which takes two arguments, and .rent2~ which 
takes three arguments. But there is no detectable difference in 
meanin~ between the verbs in (94a) and (94b). 
---- -----
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(94) 	 a. Emily bought a rose. 
b. Emily bought a rose for Marsha. 
To state a verb is an !!.~place predicate; the E_ must be specified for 
some single value, and the existence of (94a) indicates that for 
~ that value is two. How then do we account for (94b)? Postal 
implicitly assumes that the deep structure of {94b) is like (95). 
(95) 
. ------ s -----
NP 	 VPI 	 ....---...:::--__ 
Emily V NP NP 
l · 	 ~ 
bought a rose for Marsha ' 
But I 	think a more .correct structure is like that in {96). 
(96) $ 
.NP1 	 VP 
I ~-----
Emily T /NP2~ 
bought NP NP 
I /~ 
a rose for Marsha 
The second argument, NP2~ is a 'nominally-complex' NP. There is 
good evidence for this analysis. Transformations operate on single 
constituents. Now notice that the following examples involving 
movement rules show that NP2 above is a single constituent. 
(97) 	 a. Q: What did Emily buy? 
A: A rose for Marsha. 
b. What Emily bought was a rose for Marsha. 
c. It's a rose for Marsha that Emily bought. 
d. 	 The rose for Marsha which Emily bought was 
an American Beauty. 
Compare (9:() to parallel examples involving the three-argument pre-
dicate give: 
(98) 	 a. Q: *What did John give? 
A: *A book to Harry. 
b, *What John gave was a cigarette to the cop. 
c. *It was a cigarette to the cop that John gave. 
d. 	*The car to his wife which John gave was a 
Cadillac. 
conclude that the deep structure of (94b) is as in {96). Now why I 
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is it that (99b) and (99c) are acceptable, 'While: (99d) is .not? :t. 
offer the following speculation. 
(99) a. Emily bought a rose for Marsha. 
b. A rose was bought for Marsha by Emily. 
c. Emily bought Mars.ha a rose. : 
d. *Marsha was bought a rose by Emily. 
Speakers of English misanalyze the parsing of (99a) to be as in (95) 
instead of (96). Based on this misanalysis, the speak.er incorrectly 
applies either Passive (to get (99b)), IO Movement (to get {99c)), 
or IO Movement and then Passive (to get (99a)). In other words, the 
speaker assumes that there are two argu:m~nts in the VP instead of 
one~ and applies rules on that basis. But why is (99d) starred? 
I think thi.s sentence is grammatical but unacceptable. Bever and 
Langendoen (1973) and Grosu (1972) argue that perceptual strategies 
play an important part in marking as unacceptable sentences which 
are grammatical (in the sense that they can be generated by the 
grammar). There must be a. strategy which assigns the superficial 
subject of a passive sentence to object position, This strategy will 
assign the NP a rose in {99b} as the direct object of bought.9 But 
when this strategy is applied to (99d} the NP Marsha is immediately 
marked as the direct object in toto of the verb bought. But this 
creates a problem, for one is speaking of buying a flower, not a 
person. Furthermore, the leftover NP a rose could only be assigned 
as·the indirect object of the verb (since the strategy already gives 
us the subject and direct object). But an inanimate NP cannot be 
the indirect object of the verb buy.10 
In sununary, I suspect that (99d) is unacceptable because speakers 
have no strategies which will allow them to effectively recover the 
underlying structure of the sentence. 11 I have tried to.base the 
remarks Just offered on a search for insight into grammatical phenomena 
rather than an attempt to find a formalism which 'handles the data•. 
Whatever the exact nature of the solution, it should be clear that 
a proper understanding will not involve an ad hoc global constraint. 
11. Coordination Reduction. 
In a (to my mind) dubious analysis Postal (1972a) claims that  
(100a) is derived from (100b) by Coordination Reduction.  
{100) a. Mary and John Smith (both) have Jobs. 
b. Mary Smith and John Smith (both) have jobs. 
These two sentences differ in that the (a) sentence there is a pre-
supposition that the individuals .named Smith are related, but there 
is no such presupposition in the (b) sentence. Postal claims that 
Coordination Reduction applies to phrases which are the names of 
human individuals only when in the semantic representation there is 
a presupposition that.the individuals have the same last name because 
they are related. Thus, ' ••• the ~onstraint is naturally ct - RNj 
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stated as an ·ad hoc filter which is not pa.rt .of .Coordination . 
Reduction as such, a filter which throws out .all derivations in 
vhich there is a semantic repre,sentation with the releitant names 
but without the relev.ant presupposition an'd a later tree in which 
the names ·hav.e been. smashed together by Coordination :Reduction' (143), 
I do not.believe that a global constraint is necessary here.  
The problem is ·that there is little reason to think that (100a) is  
derived from (100b) by Coordination Reduction. Postal would have  
to map (101a) into (101b).  
(101) a, NPCMary SmithJNP and NP [John Smith)NP 
b. NPCCMary and John) CSmithJJNP 
The same process vould map (102a) into (102b). 
(102) 	 a. John's bicycle and Mery 1 s bicycle are on the 
porch. 
b. John's and Mary's bicycles are on the porch.12 
c. *John's and Mary•s bicycle are on the porch. 
But the underlined NP's in (102a) must become plural when the  
reduction process applies~ as shown by comparing (102b) with (102c).  
If this reduction process truly maps (101a) into (101b), the name  
Smith should be pluralized, giving *Mary and John Smiths. While a  
proper name can appear in the plural in generic contexts such as the  
Smiths, it certainly cannot be plural in the context .of ( 100) • Thus,  
the mapping of (100b) into (100a} is blocked by the impossibility of  
pluralizing proper names here, and no global constraint is necessary.  
If (101b) is not derived from (101a) by Coordination Reduction, 
where does it come from? Most likely it is an instance of phrasal 
conjunction, as discussed in Lakoff and Peters (1969). There must 
be cases where conjoined NP's are generated by the phrase structure 
rules rather than derived transformationally, John and Mary are 
alike cannot be derived from *John is alike and Mm is alike, Suppose 
the deep structure of the subject NP of (100a) is as in (103), and the 
deep structure of the subject NP of (100b) is as in (104). 
(103} NP[CMary and John] SmithJNP 
(104) NPCNpCMary SmithJNP and NPCJohn SmithJNP )NP 
·We now have a natural basis t•o distinguish the semantics of (100a) 
and (100b). Since only one name Smith appears in (103), that name 
must refer to one family, and the individuals bearing the first 
names mentioned must belong to that family. In (104), two names 
~ appear, so each Smith may refer, to a different family. Postal 
has no such natural way to distinguish the meaning, On these grounds 
the analysis presented here is superior, in addition to not requiring 
a rule-specific global constraint, 
160  
12. Tough Movement. 
·Berman (1973) postulates a constraint .on Tough Mov~ment. This 
rule de:t'ived (106) from the structure underlying (105) .. 
(105) Albert is tough (for me) to get along with. 
(106) To get along with Albert is tough for me. 
How consider the rules shovn in (107)-(110) below. 
Dative Movement: 
(101) a, It is impossible to buy presents for John. 
+ b. It is 	impossible to buy John presents. 
About Movement: 
(108) 	 a •. It is difficult to talk to Mary about such 
things, 
+ 	 b. It is difficult to talk about such things 
to Mary. 
Passive: 13 
• 
(109) It is 	unpleasant to be kicked by John. 
Raising: 
(110) 	 a. It is difficult to believe [John made such 
a mistake] 
+ 	 b. It is difficult to believe John to have made 
such a mistake. 
Now notice that i~ an NP has been moved by any of the above rules 
it may not be moved by Touch Movement. 
Dative Movement: 
(111) a. It is impossible to buy John presents. 
+ b. *Presents are impossible to buy John. 
+ c. *John is impossible to buy presents. 
About Movement: 
(112) 	 a. It is difficult to talk about such things to 
Mary. 
+ b. *Mary is difficult to ~alk about such things to. 
+ c. *Such things are difficult to talk about to Mary. 
Passive: 
(113) a. It is easy to be accepted by that group. 
b. *That group is easy to be accepted by. 
Raising: 
(114) 	 a. It is impossible to expect John to know the 
answer. 
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(114) b. ~John is imposs~ble to expect to know the an.swer. 
Berman proposes that the relevant constraint is that n.o MP may 
be moved by Tough Movement if it has earlier been moved by some rule. 
There are several difficulties with Berman's analysis. T~ begin with, 
the constraint is in many instances more general than one which would 
only block Tough Movement from applying. Notice that Wh ~el Movement 
cannot apply to a sentence where Dative Movement has applied: 
(115) *Sally is a girl I would give my last dime. 
Another problem is that it is hard to see what explanation there could 
be for a constraint on re-movement of an NP. The condition could not 
be general, for there are many cases where an NP is successively 
moved by different rules: for example, an NP can be moved by Dative 
Movement and then by Passive, a raised subject can be passivized and 
then raised. again, etc. I think Berman's data can be explained by 
other means. First, I shall consider the case of Dative Movement. 
Hankamer (1973) provides extensive discussion of the notion of 
structural recoverability, primarily in regard to deletion rules. 
I can only present the major relevant points of his work, and ur~e 
the reader to go to the original for details and some very interesting 
discussions. Hanke.mer first discusses (with regard to deletion rules) 
certain restrictions which function to insure recoverability of 
deletion. 
A deletion is recoverable if, given only the statement of 
the rule effecting deletion and the output of a particular 
application of the rule, the input to the rule can be 
uniquely determined. In order to meet this condition, a 
deletion rule would have to be so formulated or so 
constrained that it could never map two distinct inputs 
into the same output. Any rule which so neutralized the 
distinction between two different underlying structures 
would introduce ambiguity, and a deletion which introduces 
ambiguity is not recoverable, (Hanks.mer 1973: 39). 
One way to prevent ambiguity from arising is by a Structural 
Recoverability Condition: 'If a deletion rule operating over a 
variable would introduce structural ambiguity by yielding the same 
output upon application to two different sources, both applications 
of the rule are blocked' (41). 
Hankamer goes on to show that this condition can be extended 
to chopping rules. It is just such a condition which will account 
for Berman's Dative Movement cases. The Structural Recoverability 
Condition precludes (115), for movement renders the chopping site 
unrecoverable, The chopping in (115) could have moved an element 
from either of the chopping sites indicated by dashe~ in (116). 
{116) *Saily is a girl I would give _my last dime 
The structural ambiguity which would otherwise exist is disallowed, 
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for the chopping site would not be uniquely recoverable without a 
Structural Recoverability Condition on chopping rules. Such a 
condition will also block (lllb) and (J..llc). The chopping site in 
(117) is not uniquely recoverable, for on structural grounds there 
are two possible chopping sites, as indicated. · 
{117) Presents are impossible to buy _John 
One of the readings (that indicated by the leftmost 'gap'} would 
be blocked by selection restrictions, but Hanks.mer (p. 30} is quite 
clear that is is structural ambiguity that is blocked, and the 
mat~er of selection restrictions is irrelevant here. 
Conditions on structural recoverability also seem to be at play 
in the Raising case. (118) has two possible chopping sites. 
(118) 	*John is impossible to expect to know the 
answer. 
A more remote structure of (118) could be either {119) or (120). 
(119) 	 It is impossible [to expect John [to know the 
answer.]] 
(120) 	 It is impossible [for John to expect [to know the 
answer,]] 
One eight raise the objection that the chopping site is recoverable 
because the restriction against Tough-moving subjects of embedded 
sentences would prevent (120) from being recovered, But recall the 
motivation for restrictio.ns on recoverability. To repeat what 
Hankamer· said, where we may substitute 'chopping' for 'deletion': 
'A deletion is .recoverable if, given only the statement of the rule 
effecting deletion and the output of a particular application of 
t.he rule,_ the input to the rule can be uniquely determined.' But 
the condition against chopping subjects is not part of the statement 
of the rule. Therefore, given only the statement of the rule, the 
chopping site is not uniquely recoverable, 
Even if the approach developed here can't block the Raising 
cases, there is another way they can be blocked. Tough Movement 
always moves the rightmost element of a sentence, save that a 
prepositional phrase of adverb may follow. But there is never a 
foilowing S, NP, or VP. In (114a) John is followed by the.VP (6r 
maybe NP or S, depending on what one thinks about pruning) to know 
the answer, a.nd application could be blocked on those grounds, 
There seems to be a different principle at work in .the Passive 
case. First, consider the form the derivation of (113) would have 
to take. 
(121) 	 a, [for that group to accept onei] is easy for one1 
~ b, [for onei to be accepted by that group] is 
easy 	for onei· 
(Passive) 
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(121)'+ c. Cto be accepted by that groupJ is easy for onei 
(Equi) 
-I> d. (to be accepted by that groupJ is easy · 
(Indefinite Deletion) 
If we then applied Tough Movement to (121d}, we would derive (113b). · 
But consider what the rules of Passive and Tough Movement do. They 
function to topicalize certain NP's, and the rest of the sentence is 
part of the comment. It is easy to see that there is a difference 
in meaning between (122a) and (122b), depending on what is topic. 
(122) a. Sonatas are easy to play on this violin. 
b. This violin is easy to play sonatas on. 
Application of Passive topicalizes ~ in the embedded sentence, 
But application of Tough Movement topicalized that sroup. If we are 
to preserve the requirement that transformations preserve meaning, 
then ~must somehow be marked as topic, so Passive can apply to it, 
and that group must also be marked as topic, so Tough Movemertt can 
apply. But a sentence cannot have two topics, which is why (113b) 
is odd. Another way to look at it is that Passive throws that group 
into the background and therefore it cannot be moved into the fore-
ground, or topic position, by Tough Movement. 
· Berman's constraint runs into problems with the About Movement 
case. To begin with, there is a question about the data, for most 
speakers that I have questioned ~ind (112c) acceptable. Furthermore, 
whatever blocks (112b) is more general, for it blocks any leftward 
movement rule. 
(123) a. *It's Mary who I want to talk about such things to, 
b, 	*Mary.is the girl who I want to talk about such 
things to. 
Given the acceptability of (112c)~ what could block movement of Mary 
to the left in (112b) and (123}? I think we don't actually have a 
condition blocking rule application, but rather a length-and-complexity 
output condition on stranding the preposition~- The more inter-
vening material there is between Mary and the preposition~~ the 
worse the sentence sounds: 
(124) a. ?Mary is difficult to talk about such things to. 
b. ?'?Mary is difficult to talk ·about these distressing 
things to. 
c.?*Mary 	is difficult to talk about things wiich 
affect her family to, 
d. 	*Mary is difficult to talk about those things 
concerning the office of the Presidency to.· 
Notice that the same phenomenon appears in sentences which do not  
involve About Movement at all: ·  
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(125) 	 ·a. Mary is impossible to speak to •. 
b. ?Mary is impossible to give presents to. 
c.??Mary is impossible to try to speak to. 
·d. *Mer:r is impossible for anyone to begin to 
try to speak 	to. 
Notice-also that if the to is carried along with the moved element, 
the sentence sounds much better: 
(126) 	 a.?*Who is it difficult to try to talk about such 
things to? 
b. 	 To whom is it difficult to try to talk about 
such things? 
Berman's article is interesting, for it points out the problem 
of spurious generalization. To be sure, a crucial pa.rt of science 
is discovering generalizations, But one can be too quick to group 
a selected set of data together and draw a conclusion. Such a move 
is especially suspect when the conclusion offers no hope of providing 
an explanation, i.e. when it is purely' descriptive. In the case at 
hand, the descriptive device is unnecessary, for subsets of the data 
can be explained by reference to certain natural principles of 
grammar. When an explanation is sought the apparent generalization 
turns out to be spurious. This example points out one of the problems 
with purely descriptive formalism in a theory. 
13. Auxiliary Reduction. 
King (1970) notices that the rule of Auxiliary Reduction, which 
gives contracted forms of auxiliary .!2_, has,~. had,~. will, 
are, and am, is blocked from applying if an element immediately 
followingthe auxiliary is moved or deleted. Thus we have the 
distinction between the (a) and (b) sentences below. 
(127) a. Tell Harry that the concert's at two o'clock. 
b. 	*Tell Harry where the concert's at two 
o'clock. 
(128) a. Bill's rich these days. 
b. *Sam's richer than Bill's these days, 
My concern here is with whether a rule-specific constraint is 
needed. It is of course possible that this constraint is nonglobal. 
An attempt at a nonglobal formulation is made in Baker and Brame 
(1972). However, Lakoff (1972) presents what I think are serious 
problems with their attempt, so the question of reformulation is 
still open. So far as the question of generality is concerned, we 
need to know whether we must specifically mention the rule Auxiliary 
Reduction. Baker (1971) discusses this problem, and indicates 
that general restrictions on stress-lowering come into play, Since 
Auxiliary Reduction is dependent on prior stress-lowering, we need 
not single out any particular rule for mention. 
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Bak.er discusses the rule Auxiliary Shift, which- (in his words) 
'positions the finite auxiliary at the.left band side of the verb 
phrase, to the left of a variety of differ.ent types of preverbal 
elements' (167). If the auxiliary is emphasized, it may riot be 
repositioned to the left, as (129) and (130) show (examples from 
Baker, 169) . 
(129) a. 
b. 
c. 
We often HAVE heard those allegations. 
The money never WOULD have been found by the 
police if Jones hand't lost his key. 
Murphy never IS angry. 
(130) a. 
b, 
C, 
*We HAVE often heard those allegations. 
*The money WOULD never have been found by the 
police if Jones hand't lost his key ring. 
*Murphy IS never angry. 
Auxiliary Shift is also restricted from applying when a constituent 
following the auxiliary is moved or deleted, even when the adverb 
rather than the auxiliary bears emphatic stress. 
(131) 	 a. I wonder where Gerard USUALLY is at this 
time of day. 
b. 	 I wonder where Gerard is USUALLY at this time 
of day. 
The common factor in both situations is that the auxiliary has nonlow 
stress, so we may specify that Auxiliary Shift can apply only when 
the finite auxiliary is unstressed. We can provide a uniform 
formulation of the restrictions on Auxiliary Shift and Auxiliary 
Reduction if we specify that the auxiliary be unstressed, a condition 
for which Baker provides some independent evidence in both cases. 
We can then specify that a general condition on stress lowering 
prevents application of the rules. , 
Now we must still face the question of how a deletion site 
prevents stress lowering. Baker offers the tentative proposal that 
1the principle effect of deletion sites is to block the application 
of phonological rules by intervening between two elements mentioned 
in the structural description' { 17'7). This, of course, does not 
make the restriction on stress lowering ntonglobal, for a deletion-
site mark is just a way of encoding a global constraint. 
The problem with Auxiliary Reduction is complex, and no doubt 
much remains to be said on the subject. I know of no acceptable 
nonglobal alternative, but the constraint is not rule-specific. 
have left this example out of the discussion of general constraints 
because I wish to consider only clearly syntactic global constraints. 
The issue of the interaction of syntactic and phonological phenomena 
is outside the scope of this inquiry. I mention this example because 
it has received such wide publicity. 
I 
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14. 	 Raising/Passive/Ps ch Movement. 
Postal 1972a presents a restriction on interchanging certain 
NP's. (132b) and (133b) have undergone Raising and Psych Movem_ent 
i21 the derivation from the (a) v.ersions. · 
(132) 	 a. I seem [Jerry like Lucille] 
+•b. Jerry seems to me to like ,Lucille. 
(133) a, I 	strike [Jerry like Lucille] 
+ b. 	 Jerry strikes me as liking Lucille, 
(134} differs from the two above sentences in that Passive rather than 
Psych Movement has applied. 
. 	 ( 
(134) 	 a. The police found out s[Jerry·was living with 
MargaretJs 
+ 	 b. Jerry was found out by the police to·be living 
with Margaret. 
There is a constraint on coreference in sentences which undergo 
either Passive or Psych Movement: 
(135) a.·*Jerry seemed to me to like me. 
/ b. It seemed to me that Jerry liked me. 
(136). a. *Jerry struck me as liking me, 
b. It struck me that Jerry liked me. 
(137) a. *Jerry was claimed by Pete1 to have attacked himi• 
b. It was claimed by Pete1 that Jerry attacked himi. 
(138) 	 a. *Jerry was found out by the policei to be 
criticizing themi. 
b. 	 It was found out by the policei that Jerry 
was criticizing them1 • 
The relevant 	constraint is: 
(139) Throw 	out all derivations which have both: 
(i) an underlying structure of the form: 
where NP1 and NP4 are stipulated coreference; 
and · 
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(139) (ii) a later derived structure of the form: 
This constraint blocks derivations in which NP3 above is raised into 
S1, and then interchanged with NP1 by either Psych Movement or Passive. 
15, Comparative Simplification. 
A constraint discovered by Michael Geis (1973) states that the 
rule of Comparative Simplification can apply (with the lexical item 
earlier than).only when the verb modified by at a time is identical 
to the verb originally modified by at which. Geis derives (141) 
from (140) by a rule which deletes the underlined material, 
(140) 	 John left at a time which was egrlier than the 
time at which you left. 
(141) John left earlier than you left, 
Notice that (142a) is ambiguous, since at which could modify either 
say or leave, 
(142) a. John left at a time which was earlier than 
the time at which you said that Pete left. 
b, John left earlier than you said that Pete left. 
But (142b) is unambiguous since the underlined material can be deleted 
by Comparative Simplification only if at which {as well as at a time) 
modifies the verb leave. Notice that we must also mention the 
distinction betweeii"tiie lexical items earlier than and before, for 
(143), unlike (142b), retains ambiguity after Comparative 
Simplification. 
(143) John left before you said that Bill left. 
16. Summary. 
In this paper I have presented those global constraints which 
mention the names of specific rules in their forllUlation. I have 
shown that the overwhelllling majority of these are not rule~specific 
global constraints. Either they are instances of general· global . 
constraints, or.they are nonglobal constraints (deep structure 
constraints, surface structure constraints, constraints on the way 
some particular rule operates).· I showed in Neeld (1974: Chapter Two) 
that the general constraints, however, could not be reduced to 
nonglobal alternatives. There are only two rule-specific const~aints 
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that I have not provided an alternative for: Postal 1 s constraint 
o~ moving .a raised NP under certain conditions (section 14) and 
the constraint_proposed by Geis on Comparative Simplification, 
Hopefully, future research will show that these are either nonglobal 
or general, or that there is some basis to explain why these exceptions 
exist. In any event, the fact that so many of the rule-specific 
constraints have nonglobal alternatives lends credence to the idea 
that grammars should not contain rule-specific global constraints, 
Footnotes 
*This paper constitutes Chapter Three of my Ohio State 
University doctoral dissertation, Global Constraints in Syntax, 
completed in late May of 1974. The version presented here embodies 
no substantive revisions, only a few changes to make the text read 
easier in isolation from the rest of the dissertation. Several 
issues require further development. In particular, the data presented 
in sections 14 and 15 need some reformulation in general or nonglobal 
terms. Furthermore, while I feel that perceptual- strategies are at 
work in section 10, the discussion is tentative in view of the 
preliminary nature of research on syntactic perception (but see 
Grosu (1972) for a trailblazing foray into the area). In spite of 
these deficiencies, I feel that the work is valuable and release it 
to my colleagues in hopes that it will prove useful to them, For 
the interested reader, Chapter Four of the dissertation places the 
results within the theoretical framework of transformational grammar. 
In fact, the discussion here is part of the larger issue concerning 
the place of filters in linguistic theory, an issue to which the 
present essay is prologue. My reading cormnittee, Michael Geis, 
Arnold Zwicky, David Dowty, and David Stampe offered many insightful 
conunents which greatly improved the content of this work. To them, 
much thanks. 
1. Fauconnier shows that the Andrews-Lakoff global constraint 
is empirically inadequate, for there are in Greek constructions 
parallel to the 1 accusat1vus cum infinitive' construction of Latin 
(cf. Fauconnier (1971: 149-54)). There a.re infinitival complements 
in which the subject of the infinitive is in the accusative case, 
and likewise any predicate modifiers of the subject. Yet if the 
subject of the infinitive is deleted by Equi, the modifiers take on 
the case of the controller for Equi, The global constraint cannot· 
account for this, for at no point is the controller NP the derived 
subject of the infinitive. But Fauconnier's solution can easily 
account for such cases. Andrews tries to patch up the global 
constraint by having Equi superimpose the lower NP on the controller. 
Such a move would introduce an entirely new type of rule into 
transformational grammar and there is no independent motivation for it. 
Furthermore Fauconnier (1973: 17) points out that Andrews' 
proposal fails in configurations like 
[ •• NPi. • • NP2 
So . X X 
tease lJ[case 2J[case 3 = a~c~J. 
because NP3x would be superimposed on NP1x before case marking, 
and A could only take case 1; In fact, A can take case 1~ 2, or 3 
except when the controller NPlx is in the nominative. Examples are 
in Andrews (1971). 
2. See Langacker (1969) and Ross (1967), Roughly, the 
constraint specifies that an anaphor may not both precede and command 
its antecedent. 
3. In a footnote Postal claims that the relevant sentences go 
through derivations of the following sort: 
(i) Harry needed green bananas, and so George bought 
numerous bananas which were such that they were 
green. 
-+ (ii) Harry needed green bananas and so George bought 
numerous such bananas. 
+ 	 (iii) *Harry needed green bananas and so George bought 
numerous (such) (ones). 
Postal concludes that this is evidence against blocking underlying 
structures in this case. But this is a non sequitur. All that is 
required is some statement of the incompatibility of numerous with 
a following NP containing the item such (or the semantic material 
in its lexical decomposition), --
4, This rule is separate from the rule (usually called 
Quantifier Floating) which positions all, both~ each, etc., into 
the post-auxiliary position of the verb phrase. 
5,· It is interesting that a movement ruie either moves some-
thing over only one clause boundary (for example Raising) or else it 
is unbounded, There are no rules which move something over only two 
boundaries. three boundaries, odd numbered boundaries, etc. 
6. The unbounded movement rules operate in a single swoop, 
and are not successive cyclic, See Postal (1972c: 471-2; 1972d}. 
7, Fauconnier (1971: Chapter V) claims that QF in French ce.n 
operate to the l~ft. But the only sentences he gives in evidence of 
this are those such as (76a), for which he claims the derivation: 
{i} 	 a. J 1ai mange chacun (de) NP, 
-+ b. J'ai chacun mange NP. (by QF) 
+ c. Je les ai chacun mange. (by Clitic Movement) 
But we could just as easily allow Clitic Movement to carry a pre-
nominal modifier along with the pronoun, giving {ii}: 
(ii) Je chacun les ai mange. 
Then QF applies, giving {76a}, We thus maintain that QF only 
operates to the right. 
8. Grinder (1971} replaces deletion of indefinites by the 
mechanism of optional lexicalization. This has no bes.ring on the 
present issue. 
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9, Notice that this strategy supports the misanalysis of (99a), 
where a rose is assumedto be in toto the direct object argument of 
the verb, 
10, It is a fact that there are sentences like (i) , seemingly 
parallel to (99a). 
(i) John bought a flower for the altar. 
But the NP in the prepositional phrase cannot be an indirect object, 
as shown by the fact that IO Movement cannot apply. 
(ii) *John bought the altar a flower, 
Such facts indicate that grammatical relations cannot be stated only 
on structural configurations, which is the import of recent work by 
Postal and Perlmutter. 
11, It was noticed in the literature by Fillmore and Postal 
that there are dialects (or perhaps idiolects) in which (99d) is 
acceptable. Neither Fillmore nor Postai can give a basis for a 
natural explanation of the dialect differences, Fillmore must 
postulate alternative rule orderings, a solution not only ad hoc but 
theoretically shaky in view of the move to eliminate extrinsic 
ordering. Postal must simply state that his constraint exists in 
some dialects but not in others. His constraint becomes even more 
ad hoc in this event. The analysis sketched above seems to me to 
provide a fruitful avenue for the study of dialect differences, 
since one expects dialects to differ on the basis of performance and 
perceptual strategies rather than on the basis of the rules and 
constraints of the grammar. In the example discussed here (99d) 
would be acceptable in some idiolects because some speakers would 
have perceptual strategies which would allow them to delay blockage 
of structures until a deeper level had been reached by application 
of other strategies. I suspect that some speakers process sentences 
at a 'deeper' level than others. The general issue has not been 
·explored in any det'ail, but I see no reason to think that all speakers 
have the same uniform set of perceptual strategies. 
12. I am. concerned with the reading of (102b) which is synonymous 
with (102a). There is another irrelevant reading of (102b) in which 
John and Mary each have more than one bicycle. 
13, In (109) Passive has applied to the lowest clause. The 
relevant intermediate stage before Passive applies is something like: 
(i) It is unpleasant for one [John kick one] 
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